ࡱ>  lbjbj2F  )))===8u<D=ZJqLLLmIoIoIoIoIoIoI$xLOI)LLLLLI))qJ L ))qmI LmI sC0E|b6=XD$YI*J0ZJDOLOHEEBO)HxLL LLLLLIILLLZJLLLLOLLLLLLLLL  :  Ajou Politics Group 19th April 2013 Denuclearising the Axis of Evil? Axis of Evil states, defining and context-post-9/11 Bush 2002 State of Union Our nation will continue to be steadfast, and patient and persistent in the pursuit of two great objectives. First, we will shut down terrorist camps, disrupt terrorist plans and bring terrorists to justice. And second, we must prevent the terrorists and regimes who seek chemical, biological or nuclear weapons from threatening the United States and the world. Our military has put the terror training camps of Afghanistan out of business, yet camps still exist in at least a dozen countries. A terrorist underworld -- including groups like Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad and Jaish-i-Mohammed -- operates in remote jungles and deserts, and hides in the centers of large cities. While the most visible military action is in Afghanistan, America is acting elsewhere. We now have troops in the Philippines helping to train that country's armed forces to go after terrorist cells that have executed an American and still hold hostages. Our soldiers, working with the Bosnian government, seized terrorists who were plotting to bomb our embassy. Our Navy is patrolling the coast of Africa to block the shipment of weapons and the establishment of terrorist camps in Somalia. My hope is that all nations will heed our call and eliminate the terrorist parasites who threaten their countries and our own. Many nations are acting forcefully. Pakistan is now cracking down on terror, and I admire the strong leadership of President Musharraf. But some governments will be timid in the face of terror. And make no mistake about it: If they do not act, America will. Our second goal is to prevent regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America or our friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction. Some of these regimes have been pretty quiet since September 11, but we know their true nature. North Korea is a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while starving its citizens. Iran aggressively pursues these weapons and exports terror, while an unelected few repress the Iranian people's hope for freedom. Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror. The Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax and nerve gas and nuclear weapons for over a decade. This is a regime that has already used poison gas to murder thousands of its own citizens, leaving the bodies of mothers huddled over their dead children. This is a regime that agreed to international inspections then kicked out the inspectors. This is a regime that has something to hide from the civilized world. States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic. We will work closely with our coalition to deny terrorists and their state sponsors the materials, technology and expertise to make and deliver weapons of mass destruction. We will develop and deploy effective missile defenses to protect America and our allies from sudden attack. And all nations should know: America will do what is necessary to ensure our nation's security. We'll be deliberate, yet time is not on our side. I will not wait on events while dangers gather. I will not stand by as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons. Our war on terror is well begun, but it is only begun. This campaign may not be finished on our watch, yet it must be and it will be waged on our watch. We can't stop short. If we stopped now, leaving terror camps intact and terror states unchecked, our sense of security would be false and temporary. History has called America and our allies to action, and it is both our responsibility and our privilege to fight freedom's fight. Our first priority must always be the security of our nation, and that will be reflected in the budget I send to Congress. My budget supports three great goals for America: We will win this war, we will protect our homeland, and we will revive our economy. September 11 brought out the best in America and the best in this Congress, and I join the American people in applauding your unity and resolve. Now Americans deserve to have this same spirit directed toward addressing problems here at home. Assessments Weapons of Mass Destruction-types and concerns Responses from international community/invasion/inspection/verifications Tensions in responses, location, sovereignty, declarations, intentions Intended and unintended consequences Who has the power?-asymetric power? use them or lost them First wave regime change Second wave regime change? North Korea Current stand off-denuclearisation and national security-how is this linked What does the North want-domestic, and international and cultural Initial Comments The Korea Times, John Delury and Chung-in Moon (Yonsei) Why is a near-term crisis unlikely? For the same reason that a senior North Korea official told one of us that the comparison of North Korea to Libya was laughable: North Koreas political system is unified around its new face, grandson Kim Jong-un. Think of him surrounded and protected, by three inner circles. The first circle is the ruling family  here, the key sign of unity is that Jong-un s aunt and her powerful husband Jang Song-thaek both received promotions along with the heir-apparent at the historic congress last year. The second inner circle is the Korean Workers Party, which has been going through a period of resuscitation in recent years. The revitalized network of party members, who now carry cell phones and are eager to travel abroad, see their prospects linked to the success of the grandson. The third circle is the military, which would be the logical competitors with the next generation Kim  but here too, there is no sign of high-level disaffection, like that in many Arab Spring states. The military has been the primary beneficiary of the  military-first politics campaign which Kim Jong-il initiated in 1995. In addition, Kim has co-opted the military through numerous incentives, while controlling it through his close confidents. So far, the military has pledged its unfailing loyalty to Kim Jong-un. But what then of the outer circle, the 20 million or so North Koreans not in the party, not members of the  core class? Even those who may wish to rebel have no networks or organizations through which to do so  there are not even the rudiments of civil society to organize resistance. For now, all signs point to what the state media is saying; Kim Jong-un is the outstanding leader of our party, army and people and great successor to his father. International Response So, the essential question: What is to be done? The most prudent course for key players in the region is to re-open or expand channels with Pyongyang in the days, weeks and months to come. The better we know the new leadership, the better we can respond to events as they unfold. For now, we expect Pyongyang to turn inward, focusing on the funeral and mourning of their leader. And Kim Jong-un may take a backseat even for a period of three years in accordance with Korean mourning traditions and the precedent set by his father after his grandfathers death in 1994. The more that Seoul, Washington and Beijing can do to draw out the new North Korean leaders, the better. Fortunately, the United States has some modest positive momentum to build on in crafting this kind of proactive diplomatic outreach. It can build on recent Washington-Pyongyang bilateral talks on issues ranging from humanitarian aid to denuclearization, signaling readiness to work with the new powers in Pyongyang in a constructive fashion. The key precedent is the bilateral negotiations between the United States and North Korea that were thrown into doubt by the sudden death of Kim Il-sung in 1994. At that time, officials of the Bill Clinton administration stayed engaged, and Kim Jong-il sure enough signed the Agreed Framework, which froze the North Korean nuclear program for the rest of the 1990s. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton would be wise to take a page out of President Clintons handling of that critical moment. Seouls reaction is even more crucial, and delicate. The South Korean public is divided over inter-Korean relations, and President Lee Myung-bak will take a hit whichever way he steps. But there have been increasing signs of fatigue with a hard-line approach, and this president, who has proven his conservative credentials, is uniquely positioned for a kind of Nixon in China moment. That may be a bridge too far for the Blue House. But at a minimum, prudence would dictate avoiding any sign of an offensive or threatening posture. Self-restraint in Seoul will encourage moderation in Pyongyang. And an expression of condolence, even an official mourning delegation such as North Korea sent to the South after the death of Kim Dae-jung, would be a bold statement of Korean solidarity in the face of ideological division. For years, political analysts and military planners have discussed contingency plans for after the death of Kim Jong-il. But now, with Kim actually dead and no sign of chaos or collapse, what we need is prudent and realistic diplomacy that lays foundations today for progress tomorrow. Down the road, the Kim Jong-un leadership is likely to shift from  military-first to  security plus prosperity. The regime has promised not just a  strong , but also a  prosperous great nation   Gangsong Daeguk. Real economic development will require foreign investment, trade, and financing; in other words, lifting of sanctions that surround the North Korean economy like a barbed wire fence. Seeing those sanctions lifted will require substantive nuclear concessions on Pyongyangs part. It is in that moment, the transition from security-only to security-plus-prosperity, when the unity of the North Korean political system would come under strain. Elements in the military might oppose sacrificing their prize possession. Hardliners will argue it would be a fools errand to give up the ultimate weapon, leaving their country exposed to an Iraqi or Libyan fate. Therefore, the path to getting North Korea over that hump starts now, with the building of constructive relationships with its new leadership and avoid playing into the hands of hardliners. From the Hankyoreh Former Grand National Party (GNP) Chairwoman Park Geun-hye outlined a new North Korea policy of trustpolitik and an alignment policy on Tuesday. In introducing the policy, Park remarked on the need to realize new developments in North Korean policy, saying policymakers in Asia and the international community must adopt a bolder and more creative approach. Parks contribution, titled A New Kind of Korea, was published Tuesday in the U.S. foreign policy bimonthly journal Foreign Affairs. In the article, Park offers balanced policy as a strategy for bringing trust-based diplomacy into inter-Korean relations What little confidence did exist between the two countries virtually disappeared last year, after North Korea destroyed the South Korean naval ship Cheonan in March and brazenly attacked Yeonpyeong Island in November, Park wrote. Park also commented on the need for trust-based diplomacy. In order to transform the Korean Peninsula from a zone of conflict into a zone of trust, South Korea should adopt a policy of trustpolitik, establishing mutually binding expectations based on global norms. In addition, Park remarked that neither those who have continually supported North Korea nor those who have continually emphasized pressure have succeeded in effecting meaningful changes in the country. A new policy is needed: an alignment policy, which should be buttressed by political consensus and remain constant in the face of political transitions and unexpected domestic or international events, she said. An alignment policy would entail assuming a tough line against North Korea sometimes and a flexible policy open to negotiations other times. To implement such an alignment policy, South Korea must first demonstrate, through a robust and credible deterrent posture, that it will no longer tolerate North Koreas increasingly violent provocations. It must show Pyongyang that the North will pay a heavy price for its nuclear threats. At the same time, Park says Seoul and its allies must also be prepared to offer Pyongyang a new beginning. Trust can be built on incremental gains, such as joint projects for enhanced economic cooperation, humanitarian assistance from the South to the North, and new trade and investment opportunities. When she met North Korean leader Kim Jong-il in 2002, Park they discussed issues including a Eurasian railway project that would reconnect the Trans-Korean Railway, which has been severed since the Korean War, and link it to the Trans-Siberian and Trans-China lines. Reconnecting the Korean railway would be a testament to mutual development and inter-Korean peace. Observers interpreted Parks contribution as the further development of a speech she delivered in 2009 at Stanford University. At that time, she said that all the nations involved in inter-Korean issues, including the U.S., China, Russia, and Japan, should work toward a permanent Northeast Asia peace and cooperation body that transcends the framework of one-off talks. Parks associates explained that she submitted the contribution to the prestigious foreign affairs journal in the interest of joining forces with the worlds foreign policy makers to consider inter-Korean issues. The article was originally scheduled for publication in late July, but this was delayed by about one month as the journal asked that it focus more on inter-Korean issues in its subject matter, while the situation in the Middle East became the primary subject of coverage. Experts in inter-Korean relations remarked that Park failed to explain how North Korea and South Korea are to put her conception of balanced policy into practice. From the Economist A dangerous neighbourhood Although Ms Park has undoubtedly shifted her party on domestic issues, foreign policy is unlikely to change much from that of outgoing president, Lee Myung-bak. Ms Park speaks some Chinese and will want to overcome the strains caused by Chinas insistence on sending North Korean refugees back home rather than to South Korea, as well as the incursion of Chinese fishing boats into South Korean waters. But relations with America are strong and she will not want to risk them merely to please China. On December 24th, the Obama administration offered South Korea four advanced spy drones. Americas expansion of its missile-defence programme in Asia raises Chinese concerns about containment. Some analysts say this will make Beijing see South Koreas alliance with America as part of a wider anti-China strategy, rather than one merely directed at North Korea. There could be problems ahead, regardless of the fluency of Ms Parks Chinese. American officials hope Ms Park can repair damaged ties with their other main regional partner, Japan. South Koreans remain angry about colonial-era sex slavery, and the ownership dispute over the Dokdo islands (known as Takeshima in Japan), visited by President Lee in August. Ms Parks father once served in the Japanese imperial army that occupied northeast China, making it politically impossible for her to show too much kindness to Japan. Shinzo Abe, Japans new premier, sent envoys to meet Ms Park on January 4th in an attempt to ease the tension, but the South Korean press has been working itself into a frenzy over Mr Abes strident nationalism. His big majority gives him leeway to be diplomatic, but any move to rescind a 1995 apology for wartime suffering his country caused would be disastrous for the bilateral relationship. Then there is North Korea. Ms Park has based her approach on reciprocity, pitched halfway between the sunshine policy of former presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, and the frostiness of Mr Lee. She says she will start with small economic projects and humanitarian aid, and engage further if the Norths leader, Kim Jong Un, chooses diplomacy with the South. She calls it trustpolitik. On January 1st Mr Kim gave the first new years speech by a North Korean leader for 19 years, calling for an end to confrontation. But, although the style may mark a change, his demand for the implementation of old sunshine-era agreements is likely to leave Ms Park unmoved. Experience shows that one of the few things North Korea can be trusted to do is to continue developing nuclear weapons. Mr Kim may well test a device soon. Ms Park will need to be prepared.  From Foreign Affairs On August 15, 1974, South Korea's Independence Day, I lost my mother, then the country's first lady, to an assassin acting under orders from North Korea. That day was a tragedy not only for me but also for all Koreans. Despite the unbearable pain of that event, I have wished and worked for enduring peace on the Korean Peninsula ever since. But 37 years later, the conflict on the peninsula persists. The long-simmering tensions between North and South Korea resulted in an acute crisis in November 2010. For the first time since the Korean War, North Korea shelled South Korean territory, killing soldiers and civilians on the island of Yeonpyeong. Only two weeks earlier, South Korea had become the first country outside the G-8 to chair and host a G-20 summit, welcoming world leaders to its capital, Seoul. These events starkly illustrated the dual reality of the Korean Peninsula and of East Asia more broadly. On the one hand, the Korean Peninsula remains volatile. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by North Korea, the modernization of conventional forces across the region, and nascent great-power rivalries highlight the endemic security dilemmas that plague this part of Asia. On the other hand, South Korea's extraordinary development, sometimes called the Miracle on the Han River, has, alongside China's rise, become a major driver of the global economy over the past decade. These two contrasting trends exist side by side in Asia, the information revolution, globalization, and democratization clashing with the competitive instincts of the region's major powers. To ensure that the first set of forces triumphs, policymakers in Asia and in the international community must not only take advantage of existing initiatives but also adopt a bolder and more creative approach to achieving security. Without such an effort, military brinkmanship may only increase -- with repercussions well beyond Asia. For this reason, forging trust and sustainable peace on the Korean Peninsula represents one of the most urgent and crucial tasks on Asia's list of outstanding security challenges. INTRODUCING TRUST A lack of trust has long undermined attempts at genuine reconciliation between North and South Korea. What little confidence did exist between the two countries virtually disappeared last year, after North Korea destroyed the South Korean naval ship Cheonan in March and brazenly attacked Yeonpyeong Island in November. North Korea also revealed that it had constructed a sophisticated uranium-enrichment facility, directly contravening commitments it had undertaken, most recently in the September 19, 2005, joint statement of the six-party talks, to forbid uranium enrichment and abandon its nuclear weapons program. As one Korean proverb goes, one-handed applause is impossible. By the same token, peace between the two Koreas will not be possible without a combined effort. For more than half a century, North Korea has blatantly disregarded international norms. But even if Seoul must respond forcefully to Pyongyang's provocations, it must also remain open to new opportunities for improving relations between the two sides. Precisely because trust is at a low point these days, South Korea has a chance to rebuild it. In order to transform the Korean Peninsula from a zone of conflict into a zone of trust, South Korea should adopt a policy of "trustpolitik," establishing mutually binding expectations based on global norms. "Trustpolitik" does not mean unconditional or one-sided trust without verification. Nor does it mean forgetting North Korea's numerous transgressions or rewarding the country with new incentives. Instead, it should be comprised of two coexisting strands: first, North Korea must keep its agreements made with South Korea and the international community to establish a minimum level of trust, and second, there must be assured consequences for actions that breach the peace. To ensure stability, trustpolitik should be applied consistently from issue to issue based on verifiable actions, and steps should not be taken for mere political expediency. Building trust between competing nations has been accomplished before. The United States and China overcame deep mutual suspicions to establish relations in the 1970s. Egypt and Israel signed a peace accord in 1979 after a gradual process of trust-building between the two sides, and the agreement remains a linchpin of stability for the entire Middle East, even after the change in regime in Egypt earlier this year. In the 1950s, European nations overcame a half century of warfare to create what would later become the European Union. Although Asia's cultural, historical, and geopolitical environment is unique, the continent can learn from these precedents, particularly Europe's experience. To begin with, Asian states must slow down their accelerating arms buildup, reduce military tensions, and establish a cooperative security regime that would complement existing bilateral agreements and help resolve persistent tensions in the region. In addition, they should strengthen existing multilateral regimes -- such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, a formal dialogue among 27 nations on East Asian security issues; the trilateral summits through which China, Japan, and South Korea coordinate their shared policy concerns; and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. Together, these efforts would help form a more resilient Asian security network and build trust and security on the Korean Peninsula. Such endeavors will undoubtedly take time. But if North and South Korea and other Asian countries can institutionalize confidence-building measures, they will bolster the odds that economic and political cooperation can overcome military and security competition. To establish trustpolitik on the Korean Peninsula, South Korea should adapt its past strategies toward North Korea. Previous governments in Seoul have alternatively attempted to engage and deter Pyongyang. The ones that have emphasized accommodation and inter-Korean solidarity have placed inordinate hope in the idea that if the South provided sustained assistance to the North, the North would abandon its bellicose strategy toward the South. But after years of such attempts, no fundamental change has come. Meanwhile, the governments in Seoul that have placed a greater emphasis on pressuring North Korea have not been able to influence its behavior in a meaningful way, either. A new policy is needed: an alignment policy, which should be buttressed by public consensus and remain constant in the face of political transitions and unexpected domestic or international events. Such a policy would not mean adopting a middle-of-the-road approach; it would involve aligning South Korea's security with its cooperation with the North and inter-Korean dialogue with parallel international efforts. An alignment policy would entail assuming a tough line against North Korea sometimes and a flexible policy open to negotiations other times. For example, if North Korea launches another military strike against the South, Seoul must respond immediately to ensure that Pyongyang understands the costs of provocation. Conversely, if North Korea takes steps toward genuine reconciliation, such as reaffirming its commitment to existing agreements, then the South should match its efforts. An alignment policy will, over time, reinforce trustpolitik. To implement such an alignment policy, South Korea must first demonstrate, through a robust and credible deterrent posture, that it will no longer tolerate North Korea's increasingly violent provocations. It must show Pyongyang that the North will pay a heavy price for its military and nuclear threats. This approach is not new, but in order to change the current situation, it must be enforced more vigorously than in the past. In particular, Seoul has to mobilize the international community to help it dismantle Pyongyang's nuclear program. Under no circumstances can South Korea accept the existence of a nuclear-armed North Korea. North Korea's nuclearization also poses a major threat to the international community because Pyongyang could develop long-range missiles with nuclear warheads or transfer nuclear technologies and materials abroad. Through a combination of credible deterrence, strenuous persuasion, and more effective negotiation strategies, Seoul and the international community must make Pyongyang realize that it can survive and even prosper without nuclear weapons. If North Korea undertakes additional nuclear tests, South Korea must consider all possible responses in consultation with its principal ally, the United States, and other key global partners. Even as Seoul and its allies strengthen their posture against North Korea's militarism and nuclear brinkmanship, they must also be prepared to offer Pyongyang a new beginning. Trust can be built on incremental gains, such as joint projects for enhanced economic cooperation, humanitarian assistance from the South to the North, and new trade and investment opportunities. When I met the North Korean leader Kim Jong Il in Pyongyang in 2002, we discussed a range of issues, including a Eurasian railway project that would reconnect the Trans-Korean Railway, which has been severed since the Korean War, and link it to the Trans-Siberian and Trans-China lines. Reconnecting the Korean railway would be a testament to mutual development and inter-Korean peace. And if that line were then tied to other regional lines, the effort could help develop China's three northeastern provinces and Russia's Far East -- and, in turn, perhaps transform the Korean Peninsula into a conduit for regional trade. Although tensions have delayed further discussions about the railway project in recent years, these could be restarted as a means of building trust on vital security matters. The rest of the world can help with these efforts. To begin with, strengthening the indispensable alliance between South Korea and the United States should send unequivocal signals to North Korea that only responsible behavior can ensure the regime's survival and a better life for its citizens. The EU is not a member of the six-party nuclear talks, but the model of regional cooperation that Europe represents can contribute to peace building on the Korean Peninsula. Asian countries can devise ways to adopt a cooperative security arrangement based on the model of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the world's largest intergovernmental security organization. The OSCE process of fostering security and economic cooperation could be adapted to Northeast Asia: offering guarantees that North Korea would receive substantial economic and diplomatic benefits if it changed its behavior would reassure its leaders that the regime can survive without nuclear weapons. Given its role as North Korea's principal economic benefactor and ally, China can play a critical part in prompting Pyongyang to change. Chinese efforts to encourage reforms in North Korea could be spurred by a more cooperative U.S.-Chinese relationship. As that relationship deepens, Pyongyang's outlier status will increasingly undermine Beijing's desire to improve its ties with Washington. Conversely, tensions between China and the United States might only increase North Korea's intransigence, allowing it to play the two countries off each other. From Chatham House North Korea's latest set of provocations including its warning that it cannot guarantee the safety of foreign diplomats in Pyongyang in the event of a conflict, its recent deployment of two medium-range missile barriers to its east coast, the temporary withdrawal of all North Korean workers from the Kaesong Industrial Complex, and now a warning that foreign residents of South Korea should be readying their evacuation plans, have all led to intensified fears in the region that the peninsula may be inching perilously closer to full-blown war. Notwithstanding this growing sense of unease, the mood on the Seoul street remains remarkably calm. Ordinary South Koreans go about their business, apparently oblivious to the looming nuclear-armed threat some 30 miles north of the South Korean capital. Part of this reflects the long history of living with a neighbour that routinely deploys such uncompromising and hostile rhetoric, as well as the assumption that North Koreas leaders are, contrary to the cartoon-like imagery sometimes found in the international media, rational actors who know full-well that any direct attack on the South would be tantamount to national suicide. History largely supports the assumption that the North (with the exception of the Korean war itself) has stopped short of invasion, while nonetheless seeking routinely to destabilize and antagonize its neighbour. Pyongyang has a well-established track record of using strategic provocations to try and extort concessions whether political or economic from the international community. The most recent cases of this were in November 2010 when it shelled the South Korea island of Yeonpyeongdo, and in March 2010 when it appeared deliberately to have sunk a South Korean corvette, the Cheonan, killing 46 South Korean sailors. What does North Korea want? The goal in this crisis, as in the past, has been to advance a number of objectives. By fostering a sense of crisis with the outside world, the North hopes to create a siege-mentality at home and unify its domestic population squarely behind its inexperienced 29-year old leader, Kim Jong-un. Since taking over from his father, Kim Jong-il, in December 2011, the new leader has been the subject of a carefully calibrated public campaign to present him as a near-omniscient national saviour and military genius, part of a family lineage that has its origins in the partisan state founded in 1948 through a war of national liberation against the former Japanese colonial occupiers. Provoking and sustaining a crisis is also an opportunity for the North to justify its recent decision to reopen its plutonium and uranium-based facilities at Yongbyon. By doing this, the North can hope, within perhaps as little as six months, to begin converting spent fuel into fissile material that can be used to build more nuclear weapons, thereby expanding its strategic weapons-of-mass-destruction arsenal beyond its existing complement of some half-a-dozen crude nuclear devices. Alongside these domestically-oriented goals, Pyongyang appears to have a broader international objective. It wants to express its irritation and opposition to the new, tougher sanctions, embodied in UN Security Council Resolution 2094. It also is expressing its opposition towards the large scale joint US-ROK Foal Eagle military exercises that have been taking place on and around the peninsula. Time to change tact? Above all, North Korea wants to engage the US in direct talks designed to enhance the Norths status as a legitimate, independent sovereign state, while also prising open the door to further concessions from the West. This is something that the Obama administration, wedded to a policy of 'strategic patience' where the North is concerned, has resolutely refused to do for fear of appearing to reward Pyongyang for its bad behaviour. From Obamas perspective, the Kim administration must first seriously demonstrate its willingness to freeze and ultimately abandon its nuclear programme, before it is willing to embark on substantive talks. Yet as the crisis intensifies and Pyongyang threatens to launch further provocations, it is unclear how long the Americans can maintain their conditional approach. With some diplomatic agility, the North has been trying to drive a wedge between Washington and Seoul. Last week, North Korean diplomats at the DPRK's UN delegation in New York reportedly convened an unusual meeting with a South Korean reporter, at which they indicated their desire to begin a dialogue with the new conservative administration of Park Geun-hye in Seoul. Such discussions would be an opportunity, according to the North Koreans, to reactivate the provisions of the June 15 Declaration announced at the historic 2000 summit meeting in Pyongyang between the late ROK president Kim Dae-jung and his then counterpart in the North, Kim Jong-il. The Declaration makes, among a number of provisions, a long-term commitment to promoting the unification of the peninsula, as well as measures to strengthen bilateral economic ties. Seouls susceptibility to such talks is potentially a point of difference between Presidents Obama and Park. While the new ROK leader has firmly backed military deterrence in preventing any direct attacks from the North a point reinforced by the deployment of US B52 and B2 stealth bombers and F22 stealth fighters to the region she has also, as part of her policy of 'trustpolitik' towards Pyongyang, been willing to provide unconditional humanitarian assistance to the North while hinting at a closer economic and political dialogue between the two Koreas. If dividing the US and ROK administrations is one of the Norths objectives, it does not, so far, appear to be working. Despite calls from opposition and some governing party politicians in the South for direct talks with the North or the despatch to Pyongyang of an international representative, such as Ban-ki Moon, Park is maintaining a calm, but firm posture, carefully avoiding contributing to an escalating war of words with the North. Attention seeking Notwithstanding Seouls measured response, there is also a danger that if the North is unable to persuade the Americans to talk, that Kim Jong-un will order ever more high profile provocations that could in turn be misread in South Korea or in the US as the first step in a more aggressive approach by Pyongyang. Such provocations might include the firing of medium-range test missiles off the East coast of North Korea, timed perhaps to coincide with the forthcoming April 15 birthday celebrations in honour of Kim Il Sung. A test firing, while provocative in itself, would not constitute a direct attack, but if it were ineptly conducted or if the missile, as a result of technical errors, veered of-course it could prompt a disproportionate response by nervous observers on the South Korean and American side. Pyongyangs leaders also have a track record of surprising the international community and they might opt for the unexpected perhaps a blockade of one of South Koreas islands in the contested waters off the West Coast of the peninsula, or maybe, according to some more alarmist scenarios, infiltration into the South by some of the Norths highly trained Special Forces. Historical rec/0NPsڳڟڎ}fOf60hcHhcHB*KHOJPJaJmH o(phsH -hcHhcHB*KHOJPJaJmH phsH -hcHhcHB*KHOJPJaJmH phsH !hBCJKHOJPJmH o(sH !hcHCJKHOJPJmH o(sH 'hShB5CJKHOJPJmH sH 'hShBCJH*KHOJPJmH sH $hSh&vDCJKHOJPJmH sH $hShBCJKHOJPJmH sH $hShsCJKHOJPJmH sH 0\]O { Z1"$dd1$4$7$8$[$\$a$gdcHgdcH & FgdcHgd&vDhWD^`hgdx"QR12>'gdcH & FgdcHgdBgdcH$dd1$4$7$8$[$\$a$gdcH2>?vo(ƶ~mץƥ^NChShBCJOJhShB5CJOJmH sH hShBCJOJmH sH !hSCJKHOJPJmH o(sH 'hShB5CJKHOJPJmH sH $hShcHCJKHOJPJmH sH !hcHCJKHOJPJmH o(sH hcHCJKHOJPJmH sH !hBCJKHOJPJmH o(sH $hShBCJKHOJPJmH sH *hcHhcH5CJKHOJPJmH o(sH 888888888 9v:v;_<<l=7> ??@AaCCDF]GdY1$4$7$8$gdBgd&vDgdBo((8888 9 <<[G\G]GvGz`zBz(3hShS5B*CJKHOJPJ\mH phJJJsH :jhShB0J%B*CJKHOJPJUmH phsH 3hShB6B*CJKHOJPJ]mH phsH -hShBB*CJKHOJPJmH phsH 0hShS5B*CJKHOJPJmH phsH -hShSB*CJKHOJPJmH phsH $hSh&vDCJKHOJPJmH sH $hShBCJKHOJPJmH sH hShBCJOJhShB5CJOJ\ ]G^G_G`GaGbGcGvGGI=KLNPQQQQQQQQQ $dqdd-D1$4$7$8$M [$\$a$gdBgdB$dd1$4$7$8$[$\$a$gdBvGGQQQQQQRQ[ι|cI2-hShBB*CJKHOJPJmH ph+8AsH 3hShS56B*CJKHOJPJmH ph+8AsH 0hShS5B*CJKHOJPJmH ph+8AsH -hS5B*CJKHOJPJmH o(ph+8AsH -hShSB*CJKHOJPJmH ph+8AsH hShBCJOJmH sH )jhShB0J%CJOJUmH sH -hShBB*CJKHOJPJmH phJJJsH 3hShB5B*CJKHOJPJ\mH phJJJsH QQQQQQQRTWEZWZ\_b1dhEkrmop txy|~~"gdB $dqdd-D1$4$7$8$M [$\$a$gdBQ[X[hhh~~~܀݀υΰ΂kS>)(hShBCJOJQJ^JaJmH sH )hShBB*OJQJ^JmH phsH /hShB5B*OJQJ\^JmH phsH -hShS0J&B*OJQJ^JmH phsH -hShB0J&B*OJQJ^JmH phsH -hShBB*CJKHOJPJmH ph+8AsH :jhShB0J%B*CJKHOJPJUmH ph+8AsH -hShBB*CJKHOJPJmH ph+8AsH 3hShB6B*CJKHOJPJ]mH ph+8AsH ~~~~݀Zυ} zwgd&vDgdB"gdB  z>طٷ%(3ѼѼѺўю}}gV}E}!h1)CJKHOJPJmH o(sH !h&vDCJKHOJPJmH o(sH *h.[h.[CJH*KHOJPJmH o(sH !h.[CJKHOJPJmH o(sH h&vDCJKHOJPJmH sH 6jhShB0J%B*OJQJU^JmH phsH U(hShBCJOJQJ^JaJmH sH )hShBB*OJQJ^JmH phsH 1hShBB* CJOJQJ^JaJmH phqsH ords from the Cold War not only reminds us of the Norths penchant for such limited provocations, but also makes clear as was the case during the Cuban Missile crisis of 1962 or the Taiwan Off-Shore Islands crises of 1954 and 1958 that national leaders, however experienced, are often poorly equipped to cope with the unexpected in situations involving nuclear weapons. All too often, simple luck rather than sober-minded rational calculation, has been the decisive factor in preventing such conflicts from escalating out of control. For the Obama administration it may be worth keeping in mind these historical lessons when considering how best to respond to North Korea. Maintaining deterrence is clearly critically important, but it may be prudent to combine it with a more flexible and imaginative attitude towards negotiating with the DPRK as a way of lowering the risks in this most volatile of regions. Introduction to International Relations End of Term Exam, Wednesday December 12th 3-4.15 Please answer one question as essay style What are the paradoxes and contradictions of global governance? What is the War on Terror? What are global ethics? What are the advantages and disadvantages of intervention? Does regionalisation impede or help globalisation?  http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/493116.html  http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21569073-park-geun-hye-prepares-address-some-her-fathers-legacy-plenty-her-plate  http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68136/park-geun-hye/a-new-kind-of-korea  http://www.chathamhouse.org/media/comment/view/190679     ٷ 45u & F gd&vD WDX`gd1) WD `gd1)gd&vD345]^_`ӹԹչֹ$%&'\]^_abdeghklǼjhb)0Uhb)0 hBo( h{ihBhBjhB0J%Uh rh&vDCJOJh&vDCJKHOJPJmH sH 'h1)h&vDCJKHOJPJmH o(sH 'h.[h.[CJKHOJPJmH o(sH u^Թ%]^`acdfgijklgdB#gdBhWD^`hgdx & F gd&vD01h2P. A!"#$%S b( 666666666vvvvvvvvv66666>666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666hH6666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666662 0@P`p2( 0@P`p 0@P`p 0@P`p 0@P`p 0@P`p 0@P`p8XV~PJ_HmH nHsH tHR`R \$1$4$7$8$a$ KHOJ_HaJmH nHsH tHj@2j !Bȩ 3%$dd1$4$7$8$@&[$\$a$"5CJKHOJPJQJ\^JaJ(A`( 0 } 4BiB \ \4 l4a $k $] L ,a, h0HTML xǩ6]&& hbullet5"X" h@p6]@!@ h notesheading35CJ\aJ$1$ hauthor&A& hpubyear0OQ0 h chaptertitle2a2 h booktitle36]$q$ heditor** h pagefirst(( hpagelast** h groupname,, h othertitle00 h articletitle88 h journaltitle36]&& hvol35\ L .[022 .[0 Char KHOJaJPP B ȩ 3 Char&5CJOJPJQJ\^JaJmH sH `^@"` B0| ()""$dd1$4$7$8$[$\$a$CJKHOJPJQJ^J2@22 $B MѤ¸ #$G$a$BAB #B  MѤ¸ CharKHOJaJmH sH &&@Q& B 8pH**W@a* B`u@ MѤ¸5\.@r. cH ] } '^PK![Content_Types].xmlj0Eжr(΢Iw},-j4 wP-t#bΙ{UTU^hd}㨫)*1P' ^W0)T9<l#$yi};~@(Hu* Dנz/0ǰ $ X3aZ,D0j~3߶b~i>3\`?/[G\!-Rk.sԻ..a濭?PK!֧6 _rels/.relsj0 }Q%v/C/}(h"O = C?hv=Ʌ%[xp{۵_Pѣ<1H0ORBdJE4b$q_6LR7`0̞O,En7Lib/SeеPK!kytheme/theme/themeManager.xml M @}w7c(EbˮCAǠҟ7՛K Y, e.|,H,lxɴIsQ}#Ր ֵ+!,^$j=GW)E+& 8PK!ʩ$Qtheme/theme/theme1.xmlYMoE#F{oc'vGuر i-q;ޝfvg53NjBBāJz@@VR~M _N&iA!>Ǽ3xv%1D7.#L ~uaoLz^W/}R;9~ݭ5k _2s4[.ٯ9Zm sFg]udsjPh?3dv%| k >䴡6٥yZo2h4%Cɱ<kx˹%- I_TR %1wϟBy_?|է}{) ҘHt=a+d$^baZLBTA_bEѣC\>Ln9 "1QB(v;^e<$ap1)0>ʼn$cx7" ' $! w| nRuK>V&EL+]2#'fD4Llx;ٹ:UYE\$Tf s(W☕~JTe\O*tHGHYEsM_б*þæW9/#~7qZ$*cߕrUngN%NOi4Kf"t,U;8ߵcF8v +2umě'UUwvs$%ϛzOhgڮPlFx< Ԕ+ IqbJ#u lh}ASfʌu(Q%r%o!]caSl?X.\P1MhV.dLVJZZݨfZ#0b8o,ބ^^ Hn<,& g"d1vǨn犹 ܩ>൒f Nqy^%JyϢX9\,Am\nziÙ)D]n|%lڟX̦gl冹EPk 9> ljWY DK/7gebe _膖W`VcJD1C4b!:UJ0A?=y6ʷWg1K#[]y%[BTRl⦘?#Si?3E'pSp+0P.F LlXx I 9Ô5 H md eYɨ2jaCWRt s z)כC?=b>l7[6DY*@Xi+hee*Vk;֜\9ŰX D) ?*|FL u"A3>]2ֵ褽og<r9[kvxY:;k% K cc~*G [p?aJdߔs`J4PK! ѐ'theme/theme/_rels/themeManager.xml.relsM 0wooӺ&݈Э5 6?$Q ,.aic21h:qm@RN;d`o7gK(M&$R(.1r'JЊT8V"AȻHu}|$b{P8g/]QAsم(#L[PK-![Content_Types].xmlPK-!֧6 +_rels/.relsPK-!kytheme/theme/themeManager.xmlPK-!ʩ$Qtheme/theme/theme1.xmlPK-! ѐ' theme/theme/_rels/themeManager.xml.relsPK] 9CGZZF EHZ  o(vGQ[3lNQSUWY_"]GQ~ulOPRTVX^`8@0(  B S  ? s',-.t{x^ f FOP`  yMQ&!-!""$$%%&&>'F'G'M'****+'+----..3329?999;;;;====>>_?a?@@@@@@@@yA}AAAAALCNC5F?FMM(M2MPP>QJQ,S8SVZbZ``BcPcUgYgssuuvvUw\wxxxx}yyzzn~u~wU]HP|_gƈʈ28֑LNOQRTUW[0X79)x*Q?Y?~AAAAN Nddrrcufu}}@BLNOQRTUW[333333333333333**&9@9CCVpip*<~LNOQRTUW[>?v**// 99&9&9CCTpVp[;3nO x$TuPhA$rC#*Sg+|2,on2@2vuDR9dGFT{#I*nBR4؇ @^FjMf^65_az^`.^`.pp^p`.@ @ ^@ `.^`.^`.^`.^`.PP^P`.^`.^`.pp^p`.@ @ ^@ `.^`.^`.^`.^`.PP^P`.h^`OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJ^Jo(hHohp^p`OJQJo(hHh@ ^@ `OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJ^Jo(hHoh^`OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJo(hHh^`OJQJ^Jo(hHohP^P`OJQJo(hH^`o(. p^`phH. @p@^@`phH. p^`phH. ` p` ^` `phH.  p ^ `phH.  p ^ `phH. p^`phH. p^`phH.^`CJOJQJo(^`CJOJQJo(opp^p`CJOJQJo(@ @ ^@ `CJOJQJo(^`CJOJQJo(^`CJOJQJo(^`CJOJQJo(^`CJOJQJo(PP^P`CJOJQJo(^`.^`.pp^p`.@ @ ^@ `.^`.^`.^`.^`.PP^P`.^`CJOJQJo(^`CJOJQJo(opp^p`CJOJQJo(@ @ ^@ `CJOJQJo(^`CJOJQJo(^`CJOJQJo(^`CJOJQJo(^`CJOJQJo(PP^P`CJOJQJo(^`CJOJQJo(^`CJOJQJo(opp^p`CJOJQJo(@ @ ^@ `CJOJQJo(^`CJOJQJo(^`CJOJQJo(^`CJOJQJo(^`CJOJQJo(PP^P`CJOJQJo(^`o(. ^`hH. pL^p`LhH. @ ^@ `hH. ^`hH. L^`LhH. ^`hH. ^`hH. PL^P`LhH.^`.^`.pp^p`.@ @ ^@ `.^`.^`.^`.^`.PP^P`.^`o(. ^`hH. pL^p`LhH. @ ^@ `hH. ^`hH. L^`LhH. ^`hH. ^`hH. PL^P`LhH.^`.^`.pp^p`.@ @ ^@ `.^`.^`.^`.^`.PP^P`.^`CJOJQJo(^`CJOJQJo(opp^p`CJOJQJo(@ @ ^@ `CJOJQJo(^`CJOJQJo(^`CJOJQJo(^`CJOJQJo(^`CJOJQJo(PP^P`CJOJQJo(^`.^`.pp^p`.@ @ ^@ `.^`.^`.^`.^`.PP^P`.`^``o(. 0^0`hH.  L^ `LhH.  ^ `hH. ^`hH. pL^p`LhH. @^@`hH. ^`hH. L^`LhH.uMf^nO;3BR2,9dG*Sg+A$5_avuDT{#Ion2 @^$                                   6        8!ErM)zt" ?=H iT! S-}2z !Ery* | ѹ@ ;|i0Batang96 |i0tGulim?= *Cx Courier New;WingdingsA$BCambria Math q heXY;|J ;|J !"!%),.:;?]}  2 3 ! 0 0 0000 =]([\{  0 0 0000;[2O 3qKX ?`%2!xx'Introduction to International Relations il jun jungwatsonH          Oh+'0|  8 D P\dlt(Introduction to International Relations il jun jungNormalwatson5Microsoft Office Word@2~@ސ 6@+6;|՜.+,0` hp  ,nunsaram company J (Introduction to International Relations(Introduction to International Relations Title  !"#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`acdefghiklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}~Root Entry F+6Data b1TablejOWordDocument2SummaryInformation(DocumentSummaryInformation8Macros b6b6VBA b6b6dirThisDocument >_VBA_PROJECT% PROJECT T  !"#$&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSUVWXYZ]0* pHdProjectQ(@= l #XR J< rstdole>stdoleP h%^*\G{00020430-C 0046}#2.0#0#C:\WINDOWS\system32\e2.tlb#OLE Automation`ENormalENCrmaQF  *,\C  mA!OfficgODficg!G{2DF8D04C-5BFA-101B-BDE5gAAe42ggram Files\@CommonMicrosoft Shared\OFFICE12\MSO.DLL&#M 1 Ob Libra,ry%xMSBFAs>MSFBs3 @dD452EE1-E08F0A-8-02608C4D0BB4dFM20L'EB &/;"1?D|~ C00}#0B# 5h0 AE41B2C78-5816-4A2C-87C5-C0EA0637B85@)ÚDOCUME~1\AJOUUNLOCALSTemp\Word8.0Àc8.exdd=".E .`M A.ThisDocumenPtGTisDlcuQen 2E` H1ByA",/y""+;./yx*DefaultOcxName5, 0, 0, MSForms, HTMLSelect*DefaultOcxName4, 1, 1, MSForms, HTMLSelect*DefaultOcxName3, 2, 2, MSForms, HTMLSelect*DefaultOcxName2, 3, 3, MSForms, HTMLSelect*DefaultOcxName1, 4, 4, MSForms, HTMLSelect)DefaultOcxName, 5, 5, MSForms, HTMLSelectME(S"SS"s(1Normal.ThisDocumentX(% %*h0 %*!` %*# %*% %*'( %*) 8(*\R8005*#85xAttribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument" Bas1Normal.VGlobal!SpaclFalse CreatablPre declaIdTru BExposeTemplateDeriv$Custom izC1ControlDefa@ultOcxm5, 0MSFs, HTMLS0elec"4, 19"3, 29"@92@4s9, Va *\G{000204EF-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}#4.0#9#C:\PROGRA~1\COMMON~1\MICROS~1\VBA\VBA6\VBE6.DLL#Visual Basic For Applications*\G{00020905-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}#8.4#0#C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office12\MSWORD.OLB#Microsoft Word 12.0 Object Library*\G{00020430-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}#2.0#0#C:\WINDOWS\system32\stdole2.tlb#OLE Automation*\CNormal*\CNormal XR(*\G{2DF8D04C-5BFA-101B-BDE5-00AA0044DE52}#2.4#0#C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\OFFICE12\MSO.DLL#Microsoft Office 12.0 Object Library*\G{0D452EE1-E08F-101A-852E-02608C4D0BB4}#2.0#0#C:\WINDOWS\system32\FM20.DLL#Microsoft Forms 2.0 Object Library*\G{E41B2C78-5816-4A2C-87C5-C0EA0637B850}#2.0#0#C:\DOCUME~1\AJOUUN~1\LOCALS~1\Temp\Word8.0\MSForms.exd#Microsoft Forms 2.0 Object Library.E .`M  #XR.ThisDocument0B52025823ThisDocument/yA uj{X@3*X`&WordkPVBAPWin16~PWin32PMacPVBA6#PProject1 Pstdole`PProject-P ThisDocument